


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23 FEBRUARY 1988



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JPRS Report



Arms Control

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U.S. Testing of Alpha Laser Called 'Provocative'

52200014 Toronto *THE GLOBE AND MAIL* in
English 5 Jan 88 p A6

[Text] After a brief pause for peace, the United States is back on track, doing tests of a military laser that the administration wants to put into space as part of its Star Wars defence system. The chemical Alpha laser is scheduled for space testing by the early 1990s, and its development is likely to launch another bitter fight in the United States about adherence to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Earlier this year, the testing of chemical lasers was part of what the administration cynically described as a "broad" interpretation of the treaty—one that would permit advanced testing of Star Wars technology. Now the Pentagon is arguing that the laser can be tested in compliance with a narrow reading of the treaty as long as it is not directed against targets that mimic the flight of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Critics say the treaty forbids any tests that demonstrate the laser's anti-missile capabilities.

However the argument comes out, that kind of legalistic hair-splitting can only devalue the ABM treaty. No agreement can be written to cover every contingency, every technological development or every whim that might seize one or the other superpower. If a treaty is to mean anything, both sides must respect the spirit in which it is signed.

In the case of the ABM Treaty, tinkering around at the outer limits of allowable testing is a violation of the spirit of strategic weapons control. John Pike, of the Federation of American Scientists, described what might be the acid test in the Alpha case: "If we saw the Russians doing it, we'd say it was a violation." In fact, the Americans cried treaty violation last month over a much lesser offence—the moving of two antiquated radar systems.

Testing the Alpha laser may not be a sufficient goad to prompt a Soviet response, but its potential is destabilizing. If the ABM Treaty is poked full of seemingly insignificant holes, it ultimately becomes a net through which anything might pass. This especially worrisome at a time when the two superpowers have agreed to negotiate a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

The greatest hope for strategic weapons control and disarmament is for both the United States and the Soviet Union to drop their plans for space-based weapons defence. The systems are prohibitively expensive (more than \$200-million has already been spent on the Alpha laser) and dangerously unreliable. Rather than promote peace, they threaten to kick off a frightening renewal of the arms race.

The development of the Alpha laser makes clear that dropping space-based plans is not in the cards—not, at least, in the near future. What might be possible is a

harder line from the U.S. Congress. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate have shown an inclination to clip the administration's wings by limiting the money available for Star Wars testing. If congressmen are sufficiently exercised by the provocative Alpha experiments, they may demand a more open accounting of arms testing. Certainly the United States would like more openness from the Soviets about their space defence plans. One way to get it would be to submit U.S. systems to closer scrutiny both at home and abroad.

Without some mutual agreement between the superpowers about strategic arms control and space-based defence, the arms race may well get out of hand again. The only real defence against war is the careful cultivation of confidence and trust. The recent accord on intermediate-range missiles proved that such confidence is possible. Playing games with space laser research shows how easily it might be frittered away.

/9274

Cruise Testing Stirs Debate on Missile Policy

52200015 Toronto *THE GLOBE AND MAIL* in
English 20 Jan 88 p A8

[Article by Jeff Sallot]

[Text] The test yesterday of a U.S. Air Force cruise missile in Canadian air space is stirring up a policy debate about the future of the weapon system and its implications for the nuclear balance of terror.

The test yesterday was of a relatively slow version of the air-launched cruise missile—the 10th in a series of test flights across the Arctic, and the first of six to take place this year, under an agreement signed by the U.S. government and the previous Liberal government in 1983.

The missile was flown to the Canadian Arctic from a U.S. base in Michigan and was launched over the Beaufort Sea in the early morning. It was recovered at 11.23 a.m. MST on the Primrose Lake air weapons range near Cold Lake, about 290 kilometers northeast of Edmonton.

Last year, the Liberals reversed their cruise testing policy and called for an end to testing in Canada, a position they reiterated in the House of Commons yesterday.

Again, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said the Conservative Government will not cancel the test agreement because it is important to maintain Western Alliance solidarity.

The flight of the ground-hugging missile drew the usual spate of protests from peace groups who have opposed the tests since they began almost four years ago.

The Canadian Peace Alliance took to the streets in 32 cities and towns to ask Canadians: "Do you agree that we should stop testing the cruise and start testing what we can do for world peace?"

Wendy Tredger, a spokesman for the group, said results indicated 7,288 of 8,895 people polled—about 83 per cent—agreed cruise missile testing should be stopped. The rest said it should continue.

Some independent arms control observers believe the political debate over the tests of the current version of the cruise missile could be missing a more significant point.

It may be more important for Canada to come up with a position on the next version, the advanced cruise missile, or ACM. The modernized ACM will pose a new set of problems for strategic planners in Moscow and Washington.

John Barrett, deputy director of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, says that the ACM may pose a greater threat to the strategic balance than the version tested yesterday because it will be faster and harder to detect. The Soviet Union might view deployment of the ACM as a U.S. attempt to develop a clear capability to carry out a first-strike nuclear attack.

The version tested yesterday is a relatively slow missile currently deployed on old, lumbering B-52 Stratofortress bombers first designed in 1955. The Soviets could therefore feel confident that the B-52-cruise combination would not be used to launch a first-strike attack.

Advocates of the Canada-U.S. testing agreement argued that the system was stabilizing rather than destabilizing because it was so easy to detect.

Those arguments may not stand up with the ACM. It will be a faster missile and it will incorporate some of the super-secret stealth technology, which will make it harder to detect by Soviet radar. It will have an improved guidance system, making it more accurate, and it will have a longer range.

The first ACM's may be deployed as early as this year at a U.S. Air Force base in Michigan. Initially, they will be used to arm B-52s. The eventual plan is to have them aboard a new U.S. bomber, the B1-B, which will be about twice as fast as the B-52. This new combination of B1-B and ACM could be considered potent enough to use as a first-strike weapon.

Mr Barrett wonders what the Canadian Government would do if it was asked to allow testing of the ACM in Canada. "Where does the Government propose to draw the line on cruise testing?"

The department of External Affairs says only that Canada is discussing future cruise missile testing with the United States. The department will not say whether these proposed tests might involve the ACM.

07310

Western European Concern Over INF Treaty Noted
40050075 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
30 Dec 87 p 6

[Article by XINHUA correspondent Yang Yuanhua
[2799 0337 5478]: "Western Europe: Concern over INF
Treaty"]

[Text] Out of consideration for their own security, the Western European countries are viewing the U.S.-Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty with mixed feelings. They are now considering the adoption of suitable policies to ensure their security.

Western European countries universally believe that although this treaty calls for the destruction of only a very small portion of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arsenals, it nevertheless marks the first real breakthrough in the disarmament talks since 1979. This breakthrough, as they believe, will serve as a means of encouraging further disarmament in other areas and thawing tense East-West relations so that the serious confrontation will be eased to a certain extent.

However, how will Europe's future security be affected by this subtle change in the U.S.-Soviet relations as a result of the INF treaty and the withdrawal of intermediate range missiles from Europe? This is the issue being deliberated in Western Europe.

First, Western Europe feels that the military threat has not been truly reduced. In nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union are evenly matched; but in conventional weapons, the Soviet Union clearly has the upper hand in their military confrontation in Europe. After the dismantling of intermediate range missiles, Western European countries will have to face threats from the Soviet Union with its superior conventional weapons, such as artillery and tanks. According to a Western estimate, the Warsaw Pact countries have conventional forces that are two to three times that of NATO, and are far ahead in short range nuclear missiles. The Western European countries are concerned over the weakening of the nuclear deterrence required for maintaining a balance of power in Western Europe. In fact, the superpowers' military competition is far from ending; they are turning from a quantitative to a qualitative contest, and from a competition in nuclear weapons to a competition in space weapons.

Second, the West European countries have many worries about the subtle change in U.S.-Soviet relations. While favoring detente, they are also concerned over their own interests. Since the beginning of the 1980's, they have had increasing worries about the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet "overhead diplomacy." During their summit meeting in Reykjavik last year, both countries agreed in principle on the dismantling of the intermediate range missiles, which has a direct bearing on Western European security. The Western European countries are

unhappy with the fact that they had no say in the important issue of their own interests, and are afraid that the United States may bargain with the Soviet Union regardless of its allies.

Third, a "decoupling" of U.S.-European defense is another fear lurking among some West European countries. The Western European countries were weakened after the war, and for a long time they had to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and stationary troops in Western Europe for their safety. They are very vigilant against the policy, long pursued by the Soviet Union, of disrupting European-American relations by taking advantage of contradictions in Western Europe. The withdrawal of intermediate range missiles from Europe undoubtedly increases Western European concern over the possibility that the United States may get out of Europe. The United States each year spends about \$150 billion on its NATO commitments—about 47 percent of its defense spending and equivalent to the grand total of the Western European countries' defense spending. In the past several years, there have been incessant demands inside the United States for it to get out of Europe. Particularly since the recent agreement between Congress and the White House on a \$75 billion budget cut, Western Europe has been even more worried about the U.S. relinquishment or reduction of its commitments.

Fourth, the Western European countries are afraid that the INF treaty would weaken the nuclear deterrence on which Western European security depends. The enforcement of this treaty would leave only two categories of guided missiles. They are particularly worried that future U.S.-Soviet arms control talks would touch on the shorter-range missiles and the nuclear forces of England and France. Therefore, England and France reiterated their need for an independent nuclear force which should not be linked to the U.S.-Soviet talks. They are afraid that the "denuclearization" of Europe would render the nuclear deterrence helpless.

The new situation after the INF treaty has brought Western European leaders together on many occasions for deliberations on their policies in order to work out a common strategy for Western European security and to accelerate preparations for a joint Western European defense. It is noteworthy that the Group of Seven nations adopted the "European Security Platform" in late October, reaffirmed nuclear deterrence and conventional forces as two fundamental props for Western Europe's security, upheld the strategic link between Europe and the United States, and emphasized the need for allied interests to be immune to any arms control move. The document clearly shows their ardent desire to step up their joint defense cooperation and to improve their political positions. It is a document with postwar European characteristics.

There are many signs that a European defense based upon the nuclear forces of England and France and the conventional forces of Germany and France is now

developing. Many countries have put forward specific plans for coordination and cooperation in Western European defense, and for exchange of information, coordination of strategies, and the strengthening of cooperation in arms production. France and Germany have announced the formation of a defense committee in January next year to consider future security from a strategic point of view. These visions and measures are still in the stage of deliberation. Even though they may eventually materialize, the defensive strength of Western Europe itself will be very limited compared with that of the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, joint Western European defense is one way for European sovereignty to be recognized.

09411

Commentary on U.S., Soviet Nuclear Inspection
06070104 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese
31 Jan 88 p 4

["Weekly Commentary" column by Dongfang Tie (2639 2455 6993): "Eye to Eye"]

[Text] For the first time, the nuclear experimental grounds deep in the Nevada desert received a number of Soviet officials and nuclear specialists several days ago. Before this, a group of U.S. nuclear specialists visited for the first time the Soviet Semipalatinsk nuclear experimental grounds in Kazakh. According to reports, each side "has found out from every necessary angle the processes of nuclear experiments" of the other side. What they saw and heard are areas classified as top secret.

In the past, these nuclear specialists could only learn the internal situation of these bases through studying photos taken by satellites or through analyzing second- or third-hand information provided by spies. Today, they have been able to observe closely for the first time with their own eyes the nuclear hinterland of the opposite side. This makes the trial of strength between the United States and the Soviet Union even more complicated and subtle.

The United States and the Soviet Union have been contending for arms superiority for several decades, each distrusting and trying to cheat or outwit the other. This has given rise to the ideas of a "cold war" and "iron curtain." At present, to meet the needs of their respective strategies, they have reached a treaty on eliminating medium-range missiles. They have also held talks on reduction of strategic weapons, limitation and prohibition of nuclear tests, and reduction of conventional arms. All these involve the question of inspection. So-called "inspection" means urging the other side to "open the nuclear bag" in order to see what and how much is inside and to find out whether the disarmament agreement reached by both sides is observed. In other words,

this means: "Verbal statements are no guarantee, and seeing is believing." This eye-to-eye inspection has a high degree of visibility and is microscopic.

For instance, articles on inspection stipulated in the U.S.-Soviet INF treaty stipulate that in the coming 13 years, the United States and the Soviet Union will check each other's original data, carry out several hundred on-the-spot inspections in all countries in which medium-range missiles have been deployed, and send large numbers of inspectors to various bases and plants. This kind of inspection is described by Reagan as "the most rigorous inspections in history" and by Soviet press as a model of "openness."

Nevertheless, since the fundamental conflict of interests between the two superpowers will not change, their deep-rooted sense of distrust of the other fostered over a very long period remains. Either "openness" or "visibility" will fall short of requirement. Just take, for example, the U.S.-Soviet INF treaty. Immediately after the signing of the treaty, which was described by the United States and the Soviet Union as the "most sincere," the United States said there was a discrepancy in the length of SS-23 missiles as shown in photos provided by the Soviet Union and those as shown in data in the hands of the United States. The Soviet Union replied sarcastically that the United States was making an issue of "something as small as a hen's egg" and that the United States has kept back some medium-range missiles. The latter the United States regarded as "a negligible minor matter as small as a fruit pit." To date, the confusion caused by the dispute over "a hen's egg" and "a fruit pit" remains. The United States and the Soviet Union have so many problems even in the elimination of medium-range missiles. What will happen to the question of strategic missiles, which is far more complicated than that of medium-range missiles?

In the areas for the trial of military strength between the United States and the Soviet Union, there is no such "all-seeing eye" as mentioned in the Bible. Their suspicions and intrigues against one another have developed to conditioned reflexes. However, since they need "detente" to reduce the pressure of the arms race on economic development, they must permit some "openness" and "visibility"; otherwise, it would be difficult to have compromise. Not long ago, the chief of general staff of the Soviet armed forces admitted that the military budget published by the Soviet Union does not reflect its actual military expenditure. This is also something unprecedented. In the past, the Soviet Union insisted that its military expenditure accounted for only about 5 percent of the total state budget, a figure which was greatly different from the one estimated by most people. Now, the Soviet Union has openly admitted that the figure is not correct, and this can be considered as a step forward. However, nobody can tell how accurate the figure to be published in the future will be. In this regard,

the United States has outdone the Soviet Union. Holding dialogue in which truth mingles with fiction, "visibility" is only a hazy notion, and "each holds a pipa, a plucked string instrument, to hide the face" will be a new characteristic in the trial of strength between the United States and Soviet Union in the future.

From now on, in some areas in which the United States and the Soviet Union think that compromise may be reached, the "black box" may be opened to a certain extent. However, in crucial areas in which their contention is fierce, they will exert their utmost to cover up the eyes of the opposite side and dark places will remain dark.

'Problems' for U.S.-USSR Arms Talks Noted
06111334 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese
1 Feb 88 p 1

[Article by Fang Min (2455 2404): "A New Round of U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Arms Talks"]

[Text] The ninth round of U.S.-USSR arms control talks began in Geneva on 14 January. These were the first talks since Reagan and Gorbachev met and signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in Washington last December. Both the United States and the Soviet Union attached great importance to the talks.

The objective in this round of talks was to draw up the text of a treaty on reducing U.S. and Soviet offensive strategic nuclear weapons. The treaty will then be signed by the two heads of states when they meet in Moscow in the first half of this year. At the same time the talks would work out a settlement to the space weapons issue. Upon arrival in Geneva, Kampelman, head of the U.S. negotiating team, stated that the United States would work hard for early completion of a treaty on strategic nuclear weapons. On the other hand the USSR side has repeatedly asserted the need to formulate a treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons as soon as possible, under the premise of adherence to the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty. However, both sides admitted that the task on hand was not an easy one and that much work remained to be done.

It has been almost 3 years since the United States and the Soviet Union started the arms control talks in March 1985. Compared with previous talks, conditions surrounding this forthcoming round have seen some changes. The most prominent one is the signing of the treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces by the two countries on 8 December 1987. While this treaty represents only a beginning in nuclear disarmament, it has to some degree set an example for the further reduction of nuclear weapons. A second change is that the two sides have become more flexible as far as their positions on the two areas of strategic nuclear weapons and space weapons are concerned. Third, both sides agreed that the inspection measures adopted in the INF treaty may be used as the basis for similar inspections in the treaty on strategic nuclear weapons. They also agreed in principle

on verification and more extensive supervision of production installations. After 3 years of negotiations and three meetings between the two heads of state, both sides have reached unanimity on certain aspects of the issues concerning the total number of strategic nuclear weapons to be reduced, the classifications and quotas for the three kinds of strategic weapons (land-based ballistic missiles, sea-based ballistic missiles, and strategic bomber planes) as well as on the question of inspection.

However, there are still many problems that have to be ironed out before an official text of the treaty on reducing strategic nuclear weapons can be drawn up. In particular, the handling of the linkage between strategic nuclear weapons and space weapons will be a sticky issue in the talks. While the joint declaration issued after the U.S.-USSR heads of state summit in Washington contained provisions, unanimously agreed upon by the two sides, for their respective negotiators to formulate an agreement to observe the 1972 ABM treaty, fundamental differences between the two sides actually continue to exist. The Soviet Union demanded strict adherence to the said treaty while the United States stressed the need to allow research, development, and experiments in the space weapon defense system. The Soviet Union demanded that agreements on reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and adherence of the ABM treaty be concluded simultaneously. On the other hand, the United States advocated conclusion of agreements on the two issues separately. These differences led to disputes between the two sides not long after the ninth round of talks started. Even though both the United States and the Soviet Union would like to come up with a treaty on reducing strategic nuclear weapons, the two sides have widely divergent positions as far as the question of weapon testing in outer space is concerned. Evidently, while conditions have changed since the signing of the INF treaty, the prospects of the Geneva strategic arms control talks remain uncertain and neither is the road ahead a smooth one.

Live Coverage of INF Treaty Discussion Noted
11092340 Beijing XINHUA in English
1233 GMT 9 Feb 88

[Text] Moscow, February 9 (XINHUA)—The commissions for foreign affairs of the two houses of the Soviet parliament met today to discuss the U.S.-Soviet treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).

The debate on ratification of the treaty, reached between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan on December 8 in Washington, began in a televised joint session of the two commissions.

The two houses, after examining the treaty, will hand over their conclusions to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet for ratification.

Opening the session in the Kremlin, Soviet party leader Yegor Ligachev said the INF treaty will pave the way for the Soviet and U.S. reduction of 50 percent of their strategic nuclear weapons.

Addressing the session, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov said, "I support ratification, on the grounds that it is in the interests of the Soviet Union." The pact reduced the possibility of a limited nuclear war in Europe, he added.

Work on dismantling equipment for manufacturing INF forces has already started, Yazov said.

The founding of a special commission to review the treaty was agreed upon in the nearly two-hour session.

Representatives from Democratic Germany and Czechoslovakia, where Soviet-made INF missiles were deployed, also attended the session.

Live coverage of the session is a major step in the reform of Soviet television.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

USSR Unit Prepares To Withdraw Missiles

08161929 East Berlin ADN International Service in
German 1659 GMT 16 Feb 88

[Text] Neubrandenburg, 16 Feb (ADN)—There is a going-home mood in the Soviet Army missile troops unit in Waren on Lake Mueritz, Neubrandenburg Bezirk. The missile troops, who began their service here after the deployment of the U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe, are now making final preparations for withdrawal to the Soviet Union and the elimination of their SS-12 weapons. A group of GDR journalists were able to witness this during a visit to the unit in the Kries town. In accordance with an agreement between the Soviet Union, the GDR, and the CSSR, the shorter-range INF missiles deployed in the GDR will be dismantled soon, earlier than originally envisaged. This was announced to the world by Erich Honecker at his meeting in late January with Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou.

Thus, even before the ratification of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, a first important step toward arms limitation and disarmament can be taken, soldiers, sergeants, officer cadets, and officers of the honored troop unit said. As agreed in the Washington treaty, a total of 2,611 missiles on both sides with a range of 500-5,000 km will be scrapped, and their warheads and deployment areas, missile operations bases, and auxiliary installations and all launch installations will be liquidated.

At a welcoming ceremony for journalists Colonel Vasilii Kazachenko, deputy chief of the political directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, spoke of an imminent historic moment. The Soviet Union, the GDR and the other allies are striving for disarmament, for a world without nuclear weapons. Such a development has long been impatiently awaited by peace-loving people all over the world.

Commanding Officer Colonel Viktor Kusmin, born in 1944 and with a daughter, a graduate of the Artillery Military Academy and holder of the "Red Star" Order, showed the journalists around the unit's facilities and training premises, as well as the accommodation and the unit's museum. Just a few days before the 70th anniversary of the armed forces of the land of Lenin, we learned that in the Great Patriotic War in the smashing of the fascist occupiers the unit fought its way for 2,600 km and, among other things, destroyed 382 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns. The legacy of the 12 Heroes of the Soviet Union from the ranks of the former antitank gunners, such as Captain Igishev or Senior Sergeant Blatonovich, whose nephew is serving here and who intends to study radio electronics in Kharkov after his army service, is still honored.

At the combat depot the "raketchiki" [missile troops] demonstrated their military mastery. At the command "battle stations", First Lieutenant Shukat Kairov's nine-man team took their places in the missile vehicle and the guiding vehicle, and in a very short time the troops had the missile ready for launching. One could see that this was an outstandingly well-coordinated military team. Set to the accuracy of a millimeter, the mighty missile stretched vertically upwards. At that moment no one in the group of journalists wanted to imagine how much destructive force can issue from such an infernal thing. It is a good thing, therefore, to know that the U.S. Pershing-2s and cruise missiles will also disappear along with these missiles.

Military skills are also shown in the loading of missiles onto transport containers. The driver of a truck-mounted slewing crane carefully moves the heavy load into the several-meter long containers, provided with white numbers and red operating instructions, with the help of commands and hand signals from 25-year old Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Loginov. We were thus able to see for ourselves that everything, down to the last missile, is ready for dispatch to the liquidation site in the Soviet Union. Transport containers for combat- and training-missiles are lined up neatly in front of us. The combat vehicles, said the commander, will be deployed in the economy for the transportation of heavy goods after the removal of the special superstructures.

There is an end-of-tour mood also among the families of the professional soldiers. We meet the tailor Ludmilla Nosarova, mother of 17-year old Olga and 10-year old Sergey, while packing cases with her husband Pavel. Pavel, a sergeant major of a battery, said "I think this step sets a good example and should spur the United States into following suit."

In further conversations the hosts informed us that they are now working out the transport space needed for the journey by train to the USSR and are coordinating with the relevant GDR government authorities on this. All members of the troop unit will be familiarized in detail about the security regulations necessary for their return.

"Our army staff is very proud that nuclear disarmament is to start in our troop unit," political representative, Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Grishko said. "At this point we would like to express our warmest thanks to our German comrades, especially in Waren Krels, for the great support and hospitality which was extended to us throughout our stay in the GDR. Their help and care has been a great help to us in fulfilling the not always easy military tasks reliably." The members of the troop unit will continue, irrespective of the technology they are given, to reliably fulfill their tasks, as in the past. "We shall continue to stand guard over socialism with our brothers-in-arms in the National People's Army and the other armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member-states, and safeguard the peaceful development of our peoples."

Discussion of Nuclear-Free Corridor Initiated

Conference on Nuclear-Free Zone Proposed 02181834 Paris AFP in English 1827 GMT 18 Feb 88

[Excerpts] Berlin, Feb 18 (AFP)—East Germany rekindled its idea of a nuclear-free corridor through central Europe by offering Thursday [18 February] to host an international conference in East Berlin on non-nuclear zones, officials said.

East German leader Erich Honecker invited representatives of states, governments, churches, political parties, parliaments, unions and other organizations to attend the conference.

Several politburo members and Defence Minister Heinz Kessler attended the first meeting of a committee formed to prepare for the conference, to be held in June. [passage omitted]

Observers said East Germany's offer to host the conference was intended to gain international support for the plan.

Appeal Message Reported

08181859 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1606 GMT 18 Feb 88

[Text] Berlin, 18 Feb (ADN)—The text of the appeal of the GDR National Committee for the preparation of the international meeting for nuclear weapons-free zones is as follows:

The peoples wish for nothing more urgently than for peace. This is the greatest good for mankind. Everything achieved by mankind is at stake if there is a thermonuclear conflict. Disarmament, and in particular the elimination of nuclear weapons, is the key to solving humanity's global problems in our time. This is why people have received with satisfaction and confidence the start to nuclear disarmament which is made possible by the 8 December 1982, Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, and the intended halving of strategic missile potentials.

The peoples of the world want further nuclear disarmament steps, for the danger of a nuclear inferno has not yet been banished. Every path leading toward a nuclear weapons-free, peaceful world should be taken. This includes the creation of nuclear weapons-free regions, zones, and corridors. Nuclear weapons-free zones already exist and are proving themselves in Latin America and the South Pacific. Everywhere, in north and south, East and West, the idea of nuclear weapons-free zones is increasing in attractiveness. The GDR, which, as is known, supports with great commitment a nuclear weapons-free corridor in central Europe and the continental and global elimination of all nuclear weapons, regards as very timely an international exchange of views and experience of the leading representatives of states,

governments and parliaments, parties, trade unions, youth, sports and womens organizations, peace movements, associations of scientists, artists, churches and religious communities, and other interested circles and personages concerning nuclear weapons-free zones.

This is why in Berlin, capital of the GDR, today a national committee for the preparation of an "international meeting for nuclear weapons-free zones" to take place in Berlin 20-22 June 1988" has been constituted.

We turn to the representatives of various political and religious ideologies, and of the most varied professions and generations on all continents, with the request that they support the preparations for this international meeting, at which an objective and open dialogue for peace and disarmament should be conducted.

Berlin, 18 February 1988

E. Honecker, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and chairman of the Council of State of the GDR Patron of the GDR Preparatory Committee for an "International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones.

Axen Addresses Committee

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[Excerpts] Berlin, 18 Feb (ADN)—Dr H.C. Guenther Drefahl, GDR Peace Council president opened the National Preparatory Committee constituent meeting with cordial thanks to Erich Honecker for his readiness to become a patron of the organization. Professor Dr Drefahl stressed that the committee included ministers, deputies from all groups and various committees of the People's Chamber, leading representatives of the mass organizations, trade union representatives, FDJ representatives and DFD [Democratic Women's League of Germany] representatives.

The committee members included the chairpersons of the befriended parties, the president of the National Front National Council, leading representatives of other social organizations, the presidents of the Academies of Science and Arts, the Writers' Union and numerous other social committees, scientific and artistic organizations and bodies.

The committee, said the Peace Council president, includes representatives from all strata of our nation—working people in industry and agriculture, representative of science, art and culture, of religious communities and Christian associations. Politicians, journalists, teachers and sportsmen and sportswomen are in the committee.

A beautiful, but also hard period of work begins for us today, said Professor Dr Drefahl. We are giving the starting signal for a new, important initiative by the

GDR, which fits logically into our state's and citizen's steadfast peace efforts. We underline our determination, he said, to actively contribute to the creation of a nuclear weapons-free world, averting the danger of nuclear war which is threatening mankind. We have always decisively worked toward this with constructive proposals and will continue in the future to demonstrate this.

Hermann Axen then spoke.

To begin with he conveyed the most cordial greetings from Erich Honecker. An international meeting of prominent representative of the states and of the broadest social movements on the specific topic of nuclear weapons-free zones appears to be of particularly urgent topicality today, Hermann Axen stressed. Pointing to the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range missiles and the agreement on a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear capacities while observing the ABM Treaty, he said: "The logical consequence of this is the task of preventing, in people's dismantling of the threatening USSR and U.S. nuclear potentials through an arms buildup in other countries or with other weapons systems. This task concerns all states and peoples. Everyone can and should help to remove the scourge of the threat of war from mankind forever, because if the arms race continues, ever more dangerous weapons systems will be increasingly automated and entrusted to the reliability of computers and the danger of a nuclear inferno will grow afresh." And this need to remove the nuclear threat, he added, recognized by good sense of men of reason and the new thinking which takes account of the risks of the nuclear age—and which Albert Einstein had already spoken about—has gained in influence throughout the world and is continuing to gain in influence. People are aware that the elementary basic condition for their freedom and for their personal happiness is "freedom from the bomb," freedom from the fear of seeing the past, present and future sinking in the fiery glow and in the ashes of total destruction. The Damocles sword of a nuclear inferno and chemical holocaust has long been hanging over mankind, Hermann Axen stressed. The knowledge of this has put too many creative, future-oriented thoughts, plans and means in chains. The elimination of all mass destruction systems is also the key to complete and general disarmament to a level of adequate defense capability. Nuclear, chemical and conventional disarmament will set free the enormous potential of the human spirit of creativity and huge material means which to date have been sacrificed to the arms Moloch for the peaceful life of the peoples and states.

Coexistence among people would become more secure and more free. What prospects would open up to today's youth and to future generations!

Hermann Axen spoke of the realization that today no one can win a nuclear war. The conclusion drawn by Communists and Social Democrats, by the realistic forces of the bourgeoisie, by believers of all religious

faiths by scientists and artists, and by statesmen of the majority of countries is that security can no longer be achieved and preserved against one another, but only with one another, and every single state, whether large or small, whether it possesses nuclear weapons or not, should do something for it. Hermann Axen pointed to the GDR's farsighted policy of limiting the harm done by the Brussels missile decision and its consequences, strengthening the struggle for peace, and putting political dialogue, reasons, and cooperation in place of military confrontation. "This policy has found support throughout the world. It proved to be increasingly successful. It corresponds to the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act and the wish of the peoples of our continent to jointly fashion a peaceful and attractive European home." "This is particularly difficult but also particularly urgent precisely here," Hermann Axen continued, "Where the two great military alliances of our time stand opposite one another eye to eye on the sensitive border between socialism and capitalism, where there is the greatest concentration of troops and equipment in a densely populated and highly industrialized area of conurbation. To create trust where it does not yet exist sufficiently; to maintain advance warning times and possibilities for the peaceful clarification of incidents where such do not yet exist; to link nuclear, chemical, and conventional disarmament with one another; to create zones of reduced armament here—This is of paramount importance for peace in Europe and in the world."

Hermann Axen stressed that the program for freeing the world from nuclear weapons proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev has intermediate stages and concrete plans. However, it also has an end aim: by the year 2000, the earth should be free of mass destruction weapons. What is meant by this are all means of mass destruction. The support of the GDR and its allies for a "third zero solution" which includes all tactical nuclear weapons and for a nuclear weapons-free corridor in Europe is anything but propaganda.

As Hermann Axen emphasized, it is, rather, the practical and convincing perception of national and European interests. Social democratic and liberal politicians and statesmen such as Andreas Papandreu, Felipe Gonzalez, Mauno Koivisto, Ingvar Carlsson, Franz Vranitzky, and many others understood this very well and devoted their attention to it. Hundreds of millions of people want to defend themselves against the nuclear threat. More and more, the conscience of the world is determining world development. "The Antarctic Treaty, the Space Treaty, the nonproliferation Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 on the banning of nuclear weapons in Latin America, and the Treaty of Rarotonga of 1986 concerning a nuclear weapons-free zone in the South Pacific all attest to the striving of nations and states for freedom from nuclear weapons. Favorable conditions are now within reach in order to realize plans for nuclear weapons-free zones in northern, central, and southern Europe; in the Indian Ocean and in Southeast Asia; on the Korean peninsula and in the Near East; and in Africa

and in the Atlantic. Thus, a network is growing which comprises the whole earth and which encourages the nuclear powers not to allow any major hiatus to occur in nuclear disarmament."

It is the concern of the international meeting, Hermann Axen stressed, to make progress with dialogue and cooperation between the multifarious peace forces which support freedom from nuclear weapons in their regions as a path toward liberating the world from nuclear weapons. The GDR and the forces involved in the country's peace movement can indeed contribute weighty words to this which will find a hearing in the world.

Numerous inquiries from home and abroad to the GDR Government and to parties and mass organizations have attested to the great attention which is being accorded to the proposal by Erich Honecker for a meeting on this set of topics. It will be an honor and a pleasure to welcome representatives of states interested in this issue, Hermann Axen said with reference to the meeting in June.

"We appeal to the United Nations and its competent special organizations to support this intention. We appeal to governments and parliaments, to political parties, to international and national peace movements, to trade unions, women's and youth organizations, to towns and communities, to scientists and artists, to the representatives of various religions and creeds, to representatives of the economy, and to all those who have an interest in zones of peace to conduct and open and

constructive dialogue here in Berlin, to outline experiences in the establishment of zones of peace and to discuss ideas and proposals for the shaping of these concepts and projects. We appeal to governments and social forces in Europe who are working for nuclear weapons-free zones in the heart of our continent, in northern Europe, in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean region, and in other areas."

"We appeal to governments and social forces in Latin America and in the South Pacific," Hermann Axen continued, "in Africa and Southeast Asia, and to the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. In a word, we appeal to all regions and countries in the world in which experiences in the establishment of such zones are already present or which support the establishment of nuclear weapons-free regions." The Berlin meeting should thus reflect all the new, positive elements which are emerging in the international political panorama of our time, he stressed. "Let us shape that meeting jointly as a broadly effective forum for a coalition of reason and the desire for peace on earth and in space." [passage omitted: minor speakers]

At the end of the discussion, Hermann Axen noted the speakers' full agreement with Erich Honecker's initiative to convene an international meeting for nuclear weapons-free zones in Berlin. Representatives of all classes and strata had underlined the urgency of an international meeting of this nature.

Hermann Axen noted the body's approval of the appeal to world public opinion which was before it. The practical work of the GDR National Committee has thus begun.

NEPAL

Commentary Welcomes Arms Accord

52004703a Kathmandu *THE RISING NEPAL* in
English 19 Jan 88 p 4

[Text] In his New Year greetings to the American public, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev characterized the December eight Summit with U.S. President Reagan as a watershed in history. The Soviet leader's remark was very well put and it reflects the feeling of not only the Soviet people but the world public opinion. In fact, all the peace-loving people the world over have every reason to believe that the December Summit between the two superpowers can rightly be called a 'landmark in the history of superpower relationship.'

Peace Concerns

Yet another time, and hopefully for the last time, the hopes of lasting peace on earth were raised high and that is where they now remain. Human concern for a lasting peace was never before raised so enthusiastically and so articulately. Ten billion plus eyes remained steadily fixed on the two glamorous actors of the Summit phenomenon: President Ronald Reagan and Mr Gorbachev.

In the beginning of the dramatic development of incidents, mild skepticism was also expressed in some parts of the world regarding the success of Mr Gorbachev's long trip to Washington. Many a renowned political pundits and lay watchers to these development must have ultimately realised that the world began to smell success in the Washington Summit even before the actual signing ritual took place on 8 December 1987, thus heralding, in Mr Gorbachev's words, "a New Day in the history of mankind." Whether the day will go down in history as a new day as the General Secretary put it so confidently and jubilantly or not remains to be seen. But one thing is certain: Peace has a better chance now than any time before.

It does not mean, however, that the mercury of optimism will remain an all time high in the scale. First, this treaty deals primarily with the medium-range missiles and so effects the people of Europe. Naturally, therefore, it does not claim that it is the last, final, word on the multifaceted issues of disarmament. Many complex issues such as the problem of verification of nuclear tests, dismantling of equal number of warheads on both parts of the globe, agreement on the specific number of weapons to be destroyed gradually on both sides are still looming large on the path of working out a more permanent and creative agreement between the two Superpowers.

If these and many other related issues are not permanently settled as outlined, envisaged and directed in the Summit Treaty, then both the sides will virtually slide down to square one on the board. It is a game the world certainly would not like to watch. For the sake of a secure and livable planet, earth, therefore, thoughts and prayers of all peace-loving mankind should now be directed

toward these issues and their possible sources so that such a pessimistic situation does not arise. Public opinion could prove an effective weapon to stop the recent developments in peace talks from taking a wrong direction. It is thus a crucial time to be reckoned with.

Universal Mandate

That arms race, more specifically nuclear race must be stopped wherever it is taking place is the long cherished will of the people of the world. The world has seen enough wars and destruction caused by wars. Man has begun to believe that the very concept of war is obsolete.

Human civilization so laborously created, developed and saved mankind's common heritage. It is for the good of all that the progress attained by mankind should be shared. Mr Schweikart, one of the Apollo astronauts rightly said that looked from the space the earth looks like a common home of all the living beings dwelling on it with no political boundaries, so rich, resourceful and so lovely. The underlying meaning of Mr Schweikart's memorable expression is that the political boundaries are artificial and drawn by man in later times.

Looked from this higher level of observation, therefore, they disappear. There then remains one home, one abode, one asset of human beings to be shared with all living beings on earth. Attempts to damage any part or whole of it, or bring about imbalance in man-nature relationship through misuse of science and technology would hardly justify any explanation.

Considering this noble truth the billions of dollar spent every day to manufacture, stockpile, and improve the already existing five thousand plus strong nuclear arsenal could in no way be called worth spending at a time when a major portion of humanity lives under the poverty line. The other half of the world sustains its standard of life with the increased amount of wealth earned from arms deals of all kinds.

Whether rich or poor, the entire humanity lives in constant dread of annihilation from the face of the planet earth. To do away with this dread the superpowers need to build up and strengthen mutual trust, not fear. Emergence of mass organizations for peace, such as the anti-war movements all over the world testify to the concern man has shown to eliminate fear in order to live, to create and grow and not destroy what has been created and maintained throughout history.

Secure World

Popular voices that have been rising for peace and survival should be further reinforced so that future summits or other venues reflect that the message has been received with due alerts and concerns and that earth or the outer space remains a secure home and that there is no danger of total, mass extinction stalking around the corner.

/12913

Development of Military Offense, Defense Viewed
02080930 Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I*
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 1, Jan 88 (Signed to Press 15 Dec 88) pp 20-32

[Article by A. Kokoshin: "The Development of Military Affairs and Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms." Passages in boldface as published]

[Text] The new political thinking in the sphere of international relations includes an understanding of the fact that an abrupt and profound politicization of traditionally military questions—the development of military equipment and the organizational development of armed forces, strategy, and operational art, and even certain aspects of tactics—has occurred before our very eyes. These questions are the subject of talks between the highest state leaders and diplomats and of debates in public and political circles.

An analysis of the problems and prospects of arms limitation and disarmament is impossible without a revelation and full-scale consideration of the patterns of development of military affairs, primarily of a long-term nature. At the same time, disarmament problems, having become practically the most important item of international relations, are making an increasingly noticeable impact on discussions about the future armed forces of states and coalitions and about military thought. This mutual influence requires profound and intensive scientific elaboration, efforts by scientists and specialists of the most diverse vocations, and an active shaping of a new scientific discipline such as military-political research.

I

Social, economic, and political factors play a decisive role in the development of the means and methods of warfare. But the internal patterns of the evolution of military affairs proper, including military equipment, are of no small importance. The new thinking requires a full-scale consideration of the dynamics of change of various weapons systems and of the shaping of the military technosphere, which was created by man, but which is developing according to special laws still largely unknown. Knowledge of these laws is a necessity. Without this, there can be no success in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy.

The rate of development of weapons systems and—according to a number of parameters—of new methods of warfare at times significantly outstrips the rate of progress at talks on limiting armed forces and arms. The main reason for this is the lack of political will of our partners at these talks and the resistance of right-wing militaristic forces in the United States and other capitalist states. But it is also necessary to bear in mind the inadequate consideration for the logic of development of

weapons systems, the evolution of strategic and operational thought, and the lack of proper correlation between this logic and political and diplomatic logic.

One of the key problems in this process is the analysis of the dialectics of development of offensive and defensive weapons and methods both in the nuclear and nonnuclear spheres. A precise diagnosis of current offensive and defensive capabilities is necessary, as are long-term and medium-term forecasts. Such comprehensive assessments and forecasts should be based on an understanding of profound historical patterns.

F. Engels paid close attention to the competition between offensive and defensive weapons (Footnote 1) (See K. Marx and F. Engels: "Works," Vol 20, pp 176-177). It should be noted that an analysis of the dialectics of development of the offensive and defensive weapons and methods was one of the main sources of Engels' outstanding military-political predictions concerning the character and results of World War I.

The confrontation between offensive and defensive weapons has continued for millennia. It seems that one can select two historical periods to reveal the basic patterns of this process. One of them began with the appearance of nuclear weapons in 1945. The other is longer and goes back 200-220 years in history; it is associated primarily with the development of capitalism and establishment of machine production.

Phases have repeatedly changed throughout these 200-220 years, within whose framework either offense prevailed over defense or defense prevailed over offense, convincingly demonstrating the manifestation of a law of dialectics—of a negation of a negation. To an ever increasing extent, these changes occurred through the development of military technology, which also entailed transformations in the methods of military operations. As Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov notes, this on no account occurred immediately after the appearance of new weapons, but only when they were used in such numbers as inevitably brought about a new qualitative status of the phenomenon. While there is a limited use of new weapons and combat equipment, they are most often adapted solely to existing methods of warfare or, at most, introduce certain partial modifications to them. For instance, machine guns were used in the 1899-1902 Boer War. However, their insignificant numbers and low quality did not lead at that time to a fundamental upheaval in the method of military operations, but only made certain changes in the combat disposition of forces. (Footnote 2) (See N.V. Ogarkov: "History Teaches Vigilance," Moscow, 1985, p 50)

The role of machine guns was more noticeable in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Thereafter, the rapid development of automatic weapons and their widespread incorporation in forces had an incomparably large impact, which was particularly graphic in World War I. (Footnote 3) (Heavy machine guns sharply strengthened

defense capability, which graphically manifested itself by the middle of World War I. The mass appearance of light machine guns on the Western Front toward the end of this war noticeably strengthened the capabilities of offensive infantry. The further development of light automatic weapons made this trend even more striking by the outbreak of World War II)

Changes in the correlation of offensive and defensive capabilities, for their part, made a very considerable impact on the policies of states and on the assessments and conclusions of state and political figures and of military commands on the nature and scale of the use of military force. Actually, the scale of political goals that it was intended to accomplish by military assets largely depended on the assessment of offensive and defensive capabilities in a specific military-political situation. Historical analysis indicates that subjective assessments were often largely and even totally at variance with reality, which naturally affected the implementation of appropriate political precepts. For instance, on the eve of World War I, practically all the sides relied on large-scale offensive operations, and in most cases with most definite goals. According to the apt statement by the outstanding Russian and Soviet military theorist, A.A. Svechin, "before 1914 the entire military world fell into an offensive hysteria." (Footnote 4) (A. Svechin: "Evolution of Military Art," Moscow, 1928, Vol 2, p 577) In reality though, defense prevailed in this war.

II

In our day, in analyzing the capabilities of offensive and defensive weapons, one most often compares World War I and II as the largest and most indicative conflicts between the most powerful agents of the system of international relations having a high level of development of productive forces. These wars were waged using all available weapons and methods of warfare with the utmost exertion of the sides' forces.

In World War I the use, in large numbers, of automatic weapons, artillery, and engineering systems, and of the forms and methods of combat operations prevailing at the time led to the fact that defense turned out to be stronger than offense. Time after time major strategic offensive operations petered out both in the Western and Eastern theaters of war in Europe. The operations of forces basically acquired a static defensive nature. (Footnote 5) (See N.V. Ogarkov, op cit, pp 48-49)

In the period between the two world wars, a number of countries actively searched for ways to overcome the situation that had arisen during World War I. At a certain point a seemingly unstable balance between offensive and defensive capabilities appeared and remained for some time, in the late twenties and early thirties.

In subsequent years, both Soviet and foreign military sciences opened up opportunities to overcome the predominance of defense over offense. (Footnote 6) (Soviet military thought developed the theory of an "operation in depth," whose modifications played an important role in the rout of Nazi Germany and its allies. The accomplishment in developing the "operation in depth" theory belongs to such prominent Soviet military theorists as M.N. Tukhachevskiy, V.K. Triandafillov, Ye.A. Shilovskiy, and A.K. Kolenkovskiy. The intention during an "operation in depth" was the simultaneous neutralization of the enemy's defense by delivery of fire to full depth, breakthrough of the tactical zone of defense in a selected sector with subsequent rapid development of tactical into operational success by engaging a breakthrough exploitation force (tanks, motorized infantry, and horse cavalry) and landing airborne assault forces to achieve the objective as quickly as possible.) Military thought in Germany was working very intensively.

From the outset, the mass utilization in World War II of breakthrough and exploitation weapons (tanks, self-propelled artillery, aviation, submarines, and aircraft carriers) imparted an active offensive nature to combat operations on land, in the air, and at sea. Tactical breakthrough immediately developed into operational breakthrough. Large mobile units, and primarily tank groups and armies played a decisive role in this process. (Footnote 7) (See A. Radziyevskiy: "Tank Attack," Moscow, 1977; M. Katukov: "On the Point of the Main Thrust," Moscow, 1976, pp 242-43; V. Semenov: "Brief Outline of the Development of Soviet Operational Art," Moscow, 1979, pp 199-250)

If one takes a look at history, it turns out that the Franco-Prussian War was mainly a demonstration of the superiority of offense over defense (and was the first static war in world history). If one moves even deeper into history one discovers that the Napoleonic wars were chiefly a triumph of offensive and active strategy. They were waged with definite goals aimed at routing the enemy's armed forces and at major territorial seizures. If one compares, for instance, the Seven Years' War with them, one can see that here there was no clear superiority of offense over defense; in a number of instances, defense generally prevailed over offense, and the definite goals set in the period of the Napoleonic wars were lacking.

Science, particular historical science, requires that exceptions to general patterns be revealed and considered. This is very important, because an exception in one phase of a certain process turns out to be a rule, a dominant characteristic in the next phase. Practically all of the aforesaid major wars in Europe had their very important exceptions. Napoleon, who had carried out a series of successful campaigns in Europe with the clear dominance of offense over defense, lost the war against Russia, whose military leaders, M.B. Barclay de Tolly and M.I. Kutuzov, used strategic defense as the main method of warfare against the invasion by the powerful Napoleonic army.

(Footnote 8) (M.B. Barclayde Tolly, and then M.I. Kutuzov had to defend the idea of this engagement in a sharp and constant struggle not only against Emperor Alexander I and his military advisors, but also against the view of the overwhelming majority of generals and officers of the Russian Army (including P.I. Bagration), who demanded a decisive engagement against the intruding enemy right on the Western borders of the Russian Empire, and then on the various lines of strategic withdrawal of the Russian Army. The course of events convincingly demonstrated the total correctness of Barclay de Tolly and Kutuzov's strategy, despite its unpopularity among a significant section of Russian society, who did not see the harsh realities of the prevailing situation and who were guided more by their emotions than by a sober calculation of the correlations of forces and the capabilities of the Russian and Napoleonic Armies—see L. Beskrovnyy: "Russian Military Art in the 19th Century," Moscow, 1974, pp 98-105)

World War I had examples of successful strategic offensive operations: the offensive on the Russian southwestern front in July-August 1916 (the Brusilov Breakthrough) and a series of offensives by the allies on the Western Front in 1918, such as the Battle of the Marne and the Amiens and Saint-Mihiel operations.

World War II, for its part, showed that a defense prepared in advance, assuming that the tactical intentions of an enemy preparing for an attack are ascertained, is quite successful and leads to a rout of the attacker's most powerful force grouping. This was the lesson of the Battle of Kursk, one of the major battles of World War II. (Footnote 9) (For more detail see: A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov: "The Battle of Kursk in the Light of Modern Defensive Doctrine"—*MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA*, No 8, 1987, pp 32-40)

In view of the general defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, the necessity and opportunities of strategic defense were clearly underestimated on the eve of the 1941 Hitlerite aggression. The possibility of defensive action was only permitted on an operational and tactical scale. (Footnote 10) (The questions of defensive operations examined at a conference of the Red Army's higher command personnel of the Red Army in December 1940 are revealing in this regard. A report on this topic was delivered by Army General I.V. Tyulenev: "The Nature of the Modern Defensive Operation." In accordance with the mission, he did not go beyond an army defense and did not explain the specifics of modern (in those times—A. Kokoshin) strategic defense. See G.K. Zhukov: "Memoirs and Thoughts," Moscow, 1969, p 190)

Considering offense as the main form of combat operations, Soviet military theory predicted that the initial period of a future war would be characterized by a large number of meeting engagements, while the belligerents'

endeavor to gain the initiative from the first hours of a war would force them to accomplish the mission by offensive operations, which would develop into meeting engagements.

At the beginning of the war, strategic defense was organized, as a rule, during the enemy's active offensive in a situation of incomplete strategic deployment and with a lack of defensive lines prepared in advance. (Footnote 11) ("The forward edge of the position almost precisely coincided with the outline of the state border, with all its bends, literally according to the slogan: 'We shall not yield an inch of our land.' This significantly increased the length of the defensive line, and created the danger of the enemy's close envelopment of our troops in the border's salients to the West. Particularly great was the danger of a deep envelopment of our quite large force groupings west of Belostok and Lvov." The enemy took full advantage of these miscalculations by us. Even such important natural lines as the main channel of the Neman River, the Avgustovskiy Canal, and the Bobr River, which were a few dozen kilometers from the border, were not used to strengthen defense, either as an obstacle in front of the forward edge or for the preparation of rear positions; (see *VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL*, No 10, 1965, p 28) In the summer of 1942, the unsuccessful outcome of defensive operations in the Voroshilovgrad sector and in the Donbass entailed a penetration and breakthrough on the southern side of the strategic front. This was used by the enemy to develop the offensive on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Thus, for the second time in the war, strategic defense became the main form of military operations by armed forces. (Footnote 12) (A. Maryshev: "Certain Aspects of Strategic Defense in the Great Patriotic War," *VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL*, No 6, 1987, p 9) [secured edition of the journal does not reveal this article] All these substantial errors led to serious defeats of the Red Army, enormous human casualties, and a considerable loss of territory.

One cannot fail to note that our postwar literature on the military art of the Great Patriotic War, right up to recent times, has mainly examined the experience of strategic offensive operations from the second half of 1943 through 1945. Often, authors have not even mentioned the fact that these operations were possible only after the initiative was seized, at the cost of enormous casualties—including through fundamental errors in the elaboration of military doctrine and strategy—from a very dangerous enemy. There is no doubt that if proper attention had been devoted to questions of strategic defense before the war, we would have paid a considerably smaller price for victory.

The origins of these miscalculations in the shaping of the Red Army's prewar doctrine go back to the late twenties, when an entire trend of military and military-political thought associated primarily with the name of Professor A.A. Svechin was virtually crushed and vilified. His works were not free of shortcomings; however, on the

basis of a comprehensive analysis of the correlations between the means of attack and protection, defense and offense, profound historical trends, the history of warfare, including World War I and its results, he made extremely important forecasts about how a second world war could begin, the nature of the threat to the USSR's western borders, and so on. (Footnote 13) (Specifically, A.A. Svechin wrote in 1927, 12 years before the outbreak of World War II: "For centuries, from the time of Richelieu, French foreign policy thought was cultivated on the creation of these conditions of fragmentation, hodgepodge, and a lack of defense capability in Europe. As a result of the operation of French policy, whose ideas developed into the Versailles 'peace' treaty, all of central Europe—Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and so on—was placed under conditions that ruled out defense and a war of position.... Poland will still have the opportunity to think about how it should thank France for the gift of the Danzig corridor, which will ensure precedence for Poland regarding a German attack." A.A. Svechin: "Strategy," Moscow, 1927, p 184)

The allies also did not utilize the possibilities of strategic defense on the Western Front in May 1940. The Armed Forces of Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, as Professor D. Proektor convincingly showed in his fundamental study, suffered a crushing defeat, largely because of a tragic error permitted during the deployment of the allied armies. (Footnote 14) (The Germans organized their forces into a deep penetration force, but the allies did not counter their disposition with a strategic defense with the necessary depth. The force grouping of the Hitler's armed forces had the opportunity to constantly support its striking power through reserves, which amounted to 31% of the troops. The allied forces had only 15% in reserve; they were deployed at an inadequate depth and dispersed across an extended front. As a result, the allies could not ward off the offensive or create a new stable defensive frontage; see D. Proektor: "Aggression and Catastrophe," Moscow, 1979, p 127)

One gets the impression that the allied command on the Western Front in May 1940 did precisely what Von Schlieffen, Germany's chief of general staff, dreamed of in his time and about which he wrote in his well-known work, "Cannae." (Footnote 15) ("A perfect reenactment of the Battle of Cannae is only encountered very rarely in military history, because for this one needs, on the one hand, a Hannibal, and on the other, a Terentius Varro, both of whom in their own way helped to achieve this great objective." Von Schlieffen: "Cannae," Moscow, 1938, p 350)

In examining the cyclic alternation of the prevalence of either offense or defense in major wars on the European Continent, including World War II, one cannot fail to note the presence of one stable long-term trend that seemingly permeates all these phases; namely, there was a constant increase in the kill capability of the weapons used and a growth in the intensity of combat operations

and in the depth of operations and territorial area encompassed by military events. There was also a increase in resources used for warfare and in the level of their mobilization and military-economic strain that each state experiences during a war.

III

How has the situation since World War II developed? This has been a period of radical and unprecedented changes in the technological aspect of the task through the creation of nuclear weapons. A gigantic leap has occurred in the kill capability of weaponry. In its strategic and political significance, the appearance of nuclear weapons surpassed even the appearance of firearms. Nuclear weapons immediately, even when the sides had only a few weapons, increased even more the advantages of offense as compared with the possibilities of defense. With the growth of the number of delivery vehicles and warheads, the question of the possibility of protection against nuclear weapons became increasingly problematic, despite the expectations that appeared from time to time of creation of an ABM defense.

The assessment of the role of nuclear weapons has undergone a substantial evolution in the postwar period. N.V. Ogarkov, in particular, validly notes that in the fifties and sixties, when there were still few of them, they were viewed only as a system capable of sharply increasing the firepower of troops. Various attempts were made to adapt nuclear weapons to the forms and methods of military operations that already existed by that time, primarily to accomplish strategic tasks. Subsequently, in the seventies and eighties, the accelerated quantitative growth of nuclear weapons of various power and the development of various long-range and highly accurate vehicles for their delivery to a target, as well as their wide incorporation in military forces, led to a radical review of the role of these weapons and to an abrupt change in the views on their role and importance in warfare, on the methods of conduct of a battle and of an operation, and "even on the possibility of fighting a war using nuclear weapons as a whole." (Footnote 16) (See N.V. Ogarkov, *op cit*, p 51)

Many assessments by Western specialists and military theorists have undergone a significant evolution. For instance, former U.S. Defense Secretary R. McNamara stresses that under modern conditions, nuclear weapons can no longer be considered as a means of waging war. (Footnote 17) (See R. McNamara: "Blundering into Disaster. Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age," New York, 1986, pp 28-35)

The appearance of these weapons, despite the revolution they have produced in military affairs, has not led to an abandonment of the development of general-purpose forces [sily obshchego naznacheniya] and conventional weapons. Moreover, many specialists stress the necessity, in peacetime, of deployed [razvernuty] and correspondingly concentrated large general-purposes forces

equipped with conventional weapons, even, perhaps, in a larger number than required before the appearance of nuclear weapons. This was validated thus: In the event of the use of weapons of mass destruction, breakdowns in the lines of communication and in systems of mobilizing reservists are inevitable. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult to make up the losses caused by a nuclear attack. Hence the conclusion that it is necessary to have, on a permanent basis, very large general-purpose forces in peacetime. As a result, at present in Europe alone, two large-scale forces in the form of NATO and the Warsaw Pact confront each other. This premise has nourished a high level of military confrontation and an arms race in nonnuclear areas as well.

Discussing the correlation of offensive and defensive weapons as applied to the nuclear period, one can briefly note the following: Let us recall, for instance, the debates in the United States in the late sixties and early seventies on the different variants of a U.S. ABM defense. At first the question of creating a dense ABM defense for the country's territory was discussed, then a "thin," dispersed ABM defense for the country's territory, and then just an ABM point defense and a system capable of protecting a proportion of American centers only from a reduced-strength strike by accidental and unauthorized launches. When the second cycle of research and development on the ABM program ended in the United States and the question arose of a spasmodic increase in appropriations for this system in connection with the upcoming deployment of one variant or another, very substantial reassessments were carried out. After fierce debates, a decision was made to virtually completely reject the creation of an ABM system. The result of these debates and corresponding military-technical and military-strategic assessments was the signing in 1972 of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty of unlimited duration.

As is known, at the turn of the seventies and eighties the idea of creating an ABM defense for the country's territory using new technology, including weapons based on new physical principles and with space-based echelons, was given new impetus in the United States and has currently become one of the main research and development programs of the Department of Defense (and of the military sector of the Department of Energy). A number of areas have already been revealed that define the potential role of this comprehensive program (the "Strategic Defense Initiative"—SDI) in the future level of the military-strategic balance.

First, we will focus attention on the program's political significance. It is aimed at undermining the ABM Treaty, which by the mid-eighties became one of the main military-political factors of strategic stability. From the military-strategic and military-technical viewpoint, the ABM system that the U.S. plans to create as a result of the realization of research and development via the SDI program could fulfill at least three functions: first, ABM defense against a reduced-strength retaliatory strike by the other side; second, the creation of a certain capability

to inflict "space-to-surface" strikes; and third, the development of a wide range of computer systems that would ensure a higher kill capability and flexibility and efficiency in using strategic offensive arms and conventional weapons and general-purpose forces. (Footnote 18) (For more detail see: "Space Weapons: A Security Dilemma," edited by Ye. Velikhov, R. Sagdeyev, and A. Kokoshin, Moscow, 1986)

In examining the question of the development of the means of offense and defense in the sphere of conventional weapons and general-purpose forces since World War II, one can note another feature. Both during the war and in the postwar period, defensive weapons—antitank artillery, antitank mines, various missile and antiaircraft missile systems, antitank guided missiles, ASW ships, and so on—were created at an intensified pace. The new possibilities of these weapons were repeatedly demonstrated in local wars in the seventies and eighties. N.V. Ogarkov concludes that at a certain stage, their skillful use balanced offensive and defensive weapons. At present diverse weapons, including air weapons, against tanks, aircraft, and, to a certain extent, ships, are rapidly developing. In the process, the qualitative and quantitative development of these weapons has reached a level that urgently requires, taking into account the operation of the laws of dialectics, careful study of new trends and possible consequences of their development. (Footnote 19) (See N.V. Ogarkov: *op cit*, pp 48-49, 54)

Beginning with the seventies, many Soviet and Western specialists began to pay increasing attention to these circumstances. Most often, for instance, one recalls the experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war in the Middle East, during which the belligerents lost no less than 50% of their tanks and aircraft in a matter of a few days. (Footnote 20) (Moreover, the war, begun by Egyptian President A. Sadat, was not a total war, but one that pursued limited objectives. See Ye.M. Primakov: "History of a Conspiracy (U.S. Middle East Policy in the Seventies and Early Eighties)," Moscow, 1985, pp 49-54) In the October 1973 war, tank warfare was the essence of the combat operations of both sides' forces. It showed the exceptional importance of special antitank weapons, and primarily antitank guided missiles, which were used by both ground forces and helicopter gunships. "The main trend in the development and refinement of antitank defense of the forces of the opposing sides was the enhancement of its stability and activeness." (Footnote 21) (V.P. Shipovalov: "Tank Warfare," VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1986, p 77) According to the assessments of many experts, the sharply increased possibilities of infantry and the continuous development of mobile antitank guided missiles has led to the fact that the combination of tanks and fighter-bombers, which has prevailed on most battlefields since 1940, is losing the function of being a decisive tactical factor. Now it is necessary to add helicopters armed with antitank guided missiles, as well as weapons against the enemy's antitank guided missiles, to the tanks and fighter-bombers. (Footnote 22) (See

"Local Wars. History and Today," edited by I.Ye. Shavrov, Moscow, 1981, pp 161, 163) As former FRG parliamentary state secretary of defense A. von Buelow notes, modern technology makes it possible to arm an ordinary infantryman on the battlefield with relatively inexpensive weapons that can shoot down, within a matter of seconds, a very expensive aircraft or destroy a heavily armored vehicle that cost a few million. (Footnote 23) (A number of specialists in military-political problems, such as F. von Hippel (United States), A. von Mueller (FRG), A. Boserup (Denmark), R. Neild (Great Britain), S. Lodgaard (Norway), and others, have reached similar conclusions)

It seems that N.V. Ogarkov's conclusion regarding the new correlation that has appeared between the possibilities of offensive and defensive weapons should be considered in all its fullness in the elaboration of practical approaches to limiting and reducing armed forces and conventional weapons. This situation cannot remain for long, if the arms race continues, and if the nature of military-political relations between states does not change. The shift to a new stage, even a qualitative leap forward, in the development of conventional armed forces and weapons is currently imminent. Weapons are appearing that are comparable in their effectiveness with weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the sharply increased operating range of conventional weapons will make it possible immediately to closely envelop, together with border regions, a large area of the territories of countries and their coalitions, which was lacking in past wars. The qualitative leap forward in the development of conventional weapons also entails a change in the nature of the preparation and conduct of operations. For its part, this presupposes the possibility of conducting operations using conventional weapons in qualitatively new and considerably more destructive ways than before.

The use of automated troop and weapons command and control systems, creation of worldwide reconnaissance systems and reconnaissance-strike complexes [razvedovatelnyye-udarnyye komplekсы], complete mechanization and high degree of mobility of troops, and use of military robotics bring about a transfer of an increasing number of the functions previously performed by people to automatic devices. The speed of operations and the rapid change in tactical and operational situation, simultaneous envelopment of large territories of a number of European countries, deliberate disruption of channels of communications, and conduct of combat operations at any time of day and night and under any weather conditions do not permit, as Army General V.M. Shabanov notes, political and high military leaders to authorize the decisions being made, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, because of a lack of time and information. (Footnote 24) (See V. Shabanov: "'Conventional' Warfare: New Dangers," NOVOYE VREMYA, 14 November 1986, p 8)

The shift to combat operations using weapons of mass destruction may be sudden and unpredictable, and this

engenders a desire to maintain one's nuclear weapons in a state of heightened combat readiness, which, for its part, substantially increases the danger of an outbreak of a nuclear war and its escalation. The mass use of conventional weapons does not rule out a deliberate or accidental attack on the enemy's nuclear and chemical weapons, including depots, missile launchers, vehicles for storing and transporting nuclear warheads and shells, loaders, and other similar targets. Its consequences could be similar to the use of the corresponding weapons of mass destruction and could upset the balance in tactical nuclear arms and provoke unpredictable retaliatory action. Strikes by conventional weapons are also capable of destroying the numerous European nonmilitary nuclear electric power stations and power plants. The result would be virtually equivalent to an attack using nuclear weapons, and the consequences would be considerably more tangible than in the Chernobyl accident. (Footnote 25) (Ibid)

All this has a most negative effect on the possibility of ensuring the stability of military-strategic balance without broad measures to limit and reduce armed forces and conventional arms.

Under the present conditions, the problem of the element of surprise in combat operations so as to achieve success in offensive and defensive operations is becoming increasingly acute. The preliminary concealed activation of men, equipment, and weapons and maintaining them in constant combat readiness is a very important prerequisite for and a decisive factor in achieving success.

On the whole, ensuring the element of surprise is considered a principle of military art that is as compulsory as the creation of superiority in men, equipment, and weapons in selected axes of main thrusts. (Footnote 25) (See "The Element of Surprise in Offensive Operations of the Great Patriotic War," Moscow, 1986, pp 194-96; "The Element of Surprise in the Operations of the U.S. Armed Forces)

It is important to bear in mind that the requirements for achieving the element of surprise largely contradict conditions for ensuring strategic stability. At the same time, due to an entire package of factors, this task has become even more complicated and considerably more expensive. As compared with the period of the Great Patriotic War, the degree of troops' saturation with various weapons and military equipment has increased. Accordingly, the volume of camouflage, concealment, and deception operations necessary for the preparation of and during an operation has grown. Moreover, it is necessary to take account of the fact that reconnaissance subunits have been equipped with new technical systems, which has substantially expanded their possibilities, while complicating the conditions for operational camouflage, concealment, and deception. (Footnote 27) (See "The Element of Surprise in Offensive Operations of the Great Patriotic War," Moscow, 1986, pp 194-96)

The approaches to the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons must take shape in anticipation of and with consideration for the real dynamics of development of new weapons, primarily long-range precision-guided weapons [vysokotochnoye dalnoboynoye oruzhiye]. (Footnote 28) (An analysis of the totality of various assessments of the mass appearance of these weapons in the NATO Armed Forces permits the assumption that this could happen within 5-10 years, counting from the present moment.) In many respects their appearance is capable of completely changing the traditional tenets of military art but not by any means in the direction required by the new thinking in the sphere of ensuring international security based on a recognition that it can only be mutual, just like strategic stability. Long-range precision-guided weapons, if they are adopted on a mass basis in forces, will bring additional instability. (Footnote 29) (Many serious military specialists have recently focused attention on the possibility of using a wide range of measures and weapons that would neutralize, or at least substantially reduce, the effectiveness of long-range precision-guided weapons. In particular, electronic warfare gear occupies a prominent place among them; see VOYENNNYY VESTNIK, No 2, 1987, pp 83-86) Their appearance would promote the development of new warfare systems and methods and make the arms race even more expensive.

One of the urgent tasks facing military-political science today is the development of conditions for ensuring military-strategic stability in a nonnuclear world (and the stages of progress toward it) and the quest for the limits of reasonable sufficiency of military capabilities, which would be determined both on a mutual and unilateral basis.

In a number of parameters, strategic stability at the level of conventional armed forces and weapons radically differs from what should take place at the nuclear level. The basis of stability in the latter case is the threat of inevitable retribution, primarily by ensuring an unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike. On the level of conventional armed forces and weapons, it is impossible to materially and practically implement a similar threat. Even if this goal were set, it would look absurd, insofar as nuclear deterrence would be replaced simply by nonnuclear deterrence, but with the same or similar catastrophic consequences.

The main thing at this level, in the context of ensuring strategic stability, is the creation of a package of conditions, in which the capabilities of defense by one side (both strategically, and operationally and tactically) would exceed the capabilities of offense by the other, and vice versa.

In elaborating the problem of ensuring a stable military-strategic balance and determining the limits of the reasonable sufficiency of military capabilities, one must bear in mind that the search for these variants of military concepts and structures of armed forces, which would be

of a clearly defensive nature, has a long tradition in Europe. Heinrich von Buelow, a prominent military affairs theorist of the 18th century, wrote: "Military art is precious to me as an aegis of security and freedom, and my duty is to study it, because I am convinced that I have ideas on how to make offense futile by improving the art of defense." Von Buelow's forerunner, Henry Lloyd, promoted the idea of natural borders in Europe that would give defense a decisive advantage over offense. (See "Warfare and Military Art in the Light of Historical Materialism," Moscow, 1927, pp 58-59)

For instance, in his fundamental work, "Strategy," published in 1911 by prominent Russian theorist General N.P. Mikhnevich pointed out the advantages of defense (both in tactics and strategy): "**Defense also has strategic advantages:** The defender is close to his resources. As he withdraws, his forces become more and more concentrated and the resources increase, while it is the opposite for the attacker.... A defender in his own country suffers less hardship than an attacker, and the mood of an army defending its own home is much more serious." For all these reasons Clausewitz considered "**defense as the strongest form of warfare.**" Commenting on this proposition of Clausewitz, A.A. Svechin wrote: "Tactically, defenders can better utilize a terrain, more widely use fortification work, and more fully exploit their fire. In strategy, defense has the opportunity to utilize the lines and depth of a theater, which forces the attacker to expend forces for the consolidation of terrain and to spend time on passage through it, while any gain of time is a new plus for defense." (Footnote 32) (A. Svechin: "Evolution of Military Art," Moscow, 1928, p 227)

Discussing the fact that defense is the stronger form of warfare, it seems that Clausewitz made an exceptionally important remark from the viewpoint of developing, on a mutual basis, approaches to strengthening strategic stability and to creating conditions for preventing a war at the level of general-purpose forces and conventional weapons: "Absolute defense is in total contradiction to the concept of warfare...." (Footnote 33) (K. von Clausewitz: "On War," Vol 2, Moscow, 1937, p 5) It follows from this view that with the shift by the two sides to purely defensive force groupings, concepts, and strategic and operational forms, the possibility of waging any large-scale war disappears. Here it is once again necessary to stress that the aforesaid applies only to general-purpose forces and conventional weapons but does not extend to the strategic nuclear sphere.

IV

An important step toward the creation of a qualitatively new military-political situation in Europe was taken by the Warsaw Pact states, which adopted the document, "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member States," at the 29 May 1987 Berlin Conference of the Political Consultative Committee.

The proposals contained in the documents of the Budapest (June 1986) and Berlin (May 1987) conferences of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states and in the statement on the Warsaw Pact military doctrine envisage the creation of a qualitatively new military-political situation in Europe, including the mutual relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Their orientation is that reducing the levels of military confrontation on the continent would preclude the possibility of a sudden attack and the conduct of offensive operations. In other words, the main goal of these joint or parallel actions by the sides is the strengthening of strategic stability with lower and less burdensome levels of military confrontation.

Without exaggerating, this formula could be called a conceptual breakthrough in this area. The reaction in various political circles of Western Europe and among a number of personages in the United States was considerable and positive. It largely corresponds to the various concepts of so-called "alternative defense" ("nonoffensive defense," "nonprovocative defense," and so on) that have been actively developing in recent years in the FRG, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, and Great Britain.

An impartial examination and comparison of the sides' military doctrines and concepts and development of a single view on the directions of their further evolution would be a substantial contribution to building confidence in Europe and enhancing the stability of the military-strategic balance. (Footnote 34) (See D.T. Yazov: "The Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine—A Doctrine of Defense of Peace and Socialism," PRAVDA, 27 July 1987)

Discussing the announcement in May 1987 of the Warsaw Pact Doctrine, Army General D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, stressed that it incorporates new views on military organizational development and on the problems of preventing a war. (Footnote 35) (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 July 1987) The prevention of war—both nuclear and conventional—has become the main task of the armed forces. This question of strategy and of military doctrine as a whole has not been previously studied to this extent. Within the framework of general defensive orientation of military doctrines, the question arises of a total correspondence between its political and military-technical components. In this connection, Soviet military leaders stress that the provisions of the Warsaw Pact military doctrine are a mandatory part of the military art and organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces and of the other allied armies. As Colonel General M.A. Gareyev, deputy chief of General Staff, stresses, the Soviet Army's main mode of operation in repulsing an aggression will be not offensive, but defensive operations and combat action. It seems that the latter very important provisions of the military-technical part of the USSR's and Warsaw Pact's military doctrine could serve, to a certain extent, as a reply to the question, frequently raised in the West, of Soviet "operational maneuver groups."

At the same time, one cannot fail to note that the Warsaw Pact countries have every reason to have a negative attitude toward the NATO concept of a "Follow-on Forces Attack" [udar po vtoromy echelonu], which essentially repeats the openly offensive American concept of "Airland Operation (Battle)." The current U.S. naval strategy, which is associated with the names of Admiral Watkins and former U.S. Navy Secretary Lehman, is of an obviously aggressive and dangerous (ultimately for both sides) nature.

Such U.S. and NATO strategic and operational concepts are completely incompatible with statements about the defensive nature of the NATO doctrine. It is noteworthy that this is recognized by many political figures and military professionals in the West, who criticize such concepts in view of their inability to ensure mutual security and strategic stability.

A frank discussion of both sides' military doctrines and concepts, and the development of a common approach to the question of the directions of their further development, is a very complex and largely unprecedented task. But the nature of the threat facing Europe and the whole of civilization in the event of the outbreak of war is also unprecedented.

It seems that it will be necessary to conduct an assessment of the combined combat capabilities of the sides as it applies both to defensive and offensive tasks to successfully solve the problem of preventing a sudden attack. In a number of parameters, this will require more complex layouts and studies than a quantitative comparison of the opposing forces in the traditional vein—comparing the number of divisions, tanks, aircraft, artillery pieces, missile launchers, and so on. It is necessary to bear in mind that there are currently considerable differences in the assessments of composition of men, equipment, and weapons of the sides (Warsaw Pact and NATO) in official Western and Soviet publications (Footnote 36) (See "Disarmament and Security. 1986," Annual of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Vol 1, Moscow, 1987, p 220), which, moreover reflect different methods of calculation. Questions associated with the elaboration of "third generation" confidence-building measures (if one takes what was adopted at the Stockholm conference in 1986 as the second generation) will require more in-depth professional preparation. Among other things, a special analysis of the role of current exercises (particularly combined-arms exercises) in the combat training of the sides' armed forces seems necessary.

Despite the problems that arise in connection with prospects for joint measures to strengthen strategic stability and to reduce the levels of military confrontation,

it is precisely this approach that is most promising. It is substantially different from the one that has been used for many years at the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe.

At present the conditions for the verification [proverka] of accords substantially surpass those that existed 30-40 years ago. This very fact alone testifies to the possibility of ensuring stability in a nonnuclear world and of enhancing the stability of military-strategic balance at various levels of nuclear arsenal reductions. Strategic stability at reduced levels of military confrontation could be achieved through the creation by each side of expressly defensive forces and structures armed with the appropriate weapons, which could not be used for a sudden attack in the interests of offensive operations. The destabilizing types of conventional weapons must be limited and prohibited.

The entire structure of the sides' men, equipment, and weapons, and of surveillance and command, control, and communications systems must be such that in the event of an outbreak of an armed conflict, it would not promote its escalation and would provide an opportunity for the supreme political leadership and military command to receive at any moment adequate information about the development of the conflict and to control it for the purposes of terminating it at the earliest possible stage.

One of the main principles of creating an essentially new system of military-strategic balance at the level of general-purpose forces and convention weapons boils down to the following: The Warsaw Pact's defensive capabilities must substantially exceed NATO's offensive capabilities, while NATO's defensive capabilities must substantially exceed the Warsaw Pact's offensive capabilities, at reduced levels of military confrontation between the two alliances. It is precisely this that the proposals of the Budapest (1986) and Berlin (May 1987) conferences of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states lead to. Success in this task would largely contribute to the creation of the necessary mutual security conditions for the switch to a nuclear-free world.

Continuing Threat From NATO Despite INF Treaty

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian of 10 January 1988 published on page 3 a 1600-word article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Markushin entitled: "Military-Political Review: To Throw Off the

Nuclear Chains". The article states that despite the signing of a U.S.-Soviet INF treaty, certain NATO circles continue to constitute a threat. They seek, first, to preserve nuclear capabilities, and second by trying to achieve conventional superiority. The preservation of NATO's remaining nuclear capability is seen as a counterweight to the Warsaw Pact's "imagined superiority" in conventional weapons.

These goals are supposedly being pursued in a number of ways. The new Trident missile to be installed on British nuclear submarines is to become a "key element in NATO military planning." Britain and France are said to be conducting "intensive talks...on equipping British Tornado fighter-bombers with nuclear armed cruise missiles. According to the "Financial Times", the French have proposed to the British government joint discussions on the "coordination of nuclear weapons targeting..." "U.S. bases in Britain, it is asserted, will be used for the deployment of additional fighter-bombers able to carry nuclear and non-nuclear cruise missiles. In the near term the French are said to plan reequipping one SSBN with the M4 ICBM and the construction of a new SSBN with the more powerful and accurate M5 missile., as well as the equipping of the Mirgae-4, Mirage-2000 and the Super Entendard with a 350 km operational-tactical missile.

"In NATO military-political circles much is currently being said about the imaginary superiority of the Warsaw Pact over NATO in conventional weapons. In this area the accent is commonly placed upon the number of tanks, while at the same time attention is diverted away from aviation and anti-tank weaponry where NATO is superior."

"The liquidation of the imbalance is possible. For this, as M.S. Gorbachev stated, 'it is necessary to sit at the negotiating table...'"

NATO is said to talk of the "Impermissibility of a 'non-nuclear Europe'" and speak against "a third nuclear zero in Europe".

"The groundlessness of the NATO position in this question consists in the fact that in contemporary conditions it is practically impossible to separate tactical nuclear weapons from conventional weapons, since the majority of the latter are capable of dual-use. Excluding nuclear weapons from these talks would make them fruitless. ..."

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Galvin Comments on Chemical Arms Storage, INF

NATO Chief on Storing Chemical Arms in Europe
08122031 Hamburg DPA in German
1820 GMT 12 Feb 88

[Text] Munich (DPA)—General John Galvin, the NATO commander, has called for storing new chemical weapons in Europe. In an interview in the weekend edition of SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, he said that the chemical weapons, production of which began recently in the United States, "should be stationed with the troops."

The general's viewpoint contradicts a decision by the Federal Government, which was recently confirmed in writing by President Reagan, the newspaper reports. According to this, the chemical ammunition now stockpiled in Europe should be withdrawn, and the new chemical weapons are to remain in the United States.

In the interview, the general says that if those "objections" cannot be overcome then the stationing of chemical weapons in the United States must be resorted to as an "alternative" to the solution which he prefers. Galvin also spoke in favor of modernizing nuclear missiles with a range of under 500 km. He was "very concerned" about the trends in the Federal Republic toward a denuclearization of Europe. There is no deterrent on the continent without nuclear weapons. According to Galvin, NATO is already modernizing nuclear short-range weapons.

Galvin on Post-INF Strategy

17141021 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 13 Feb 88 p 10

[Interview with General John Galvin, Supreme European Allied Commander (SACEUR), by Kurt Kister and Stephan A. Casdorff; date and place not given]

[Text] SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: General, in all probability the U.S. Congress will ratify the agreement on intermediate-range weapons (INF Treaty). That means there would no longer be any land-based nuclear weapons with ranges of more than 500 km in Europe. What do you as NATO's supreme commander in Europe think about it? How many and what nuclear weapons would the Alliance need?

Galvin: First of all, it is not correct to say that no long-range nuclear weapons would be left in Europe. There are still the submarine-based missiles assigned to the SACEUR. Nonetheless, a gap would be created. Your question is aimed at whether deterrence and defense would still be credible. Yes, I would still be able to carry out my mission to prevent war, and in the event of war, to defend ourselves. That would be possible with the

remaining nuclear weapons and the conventional forces. I would still have nuclear weapons with ranges of less than 500 km, aircraft, and submarine-based missiles. That means, there would be enough nuclear weapons for deterrence, and for a certain period of time, conventional defense would also be possible, at least as long as the decisionmaking process would take, if we were to decide on nuclear defense.

SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: Would the nuclear weapons arsenal of less than 500 km have to be modernized, and if so, how?

Galvin: I think we should modernize conventional forces and nuclear weapons of all ranges in time. I am saying that because I would like to see modernization as an independent factor that has to be considered whether there is an INF treaty or not, or whether or not we negotiate on the conventional or nuclear potential. To that extent, I am also expecting modernization of the shorter-range systems. To renounce that would automatically mean accepting the idea that such weapons become obsolete. In other words, we would unilaterally give up a specific class of weapons and the options connected with it.

SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: We know you are opposed to any type of denuclearization of Europe. However, there are politicians in the FRG, including in the government parties, who want to reduce short-range missiles to a minimum or abolish them. Do you fear such tendencies?

Galvin: Do not forget that I do not make the final decisions, and I do not tell anyone what has to be done regarding the means of our strategy. Sometimes I think there is the impression that we military commanders consider all those things as toys we would like to have because that would make us happier. Nothing is farther from the truth. I will do my best to fulfill my mission. However, I expect to get sufficient means to do so. If that is not the case, I have to reconsider the strategy or make other provisions.

SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: So you do not fear the denuclearization tendencies in Germany?

Galvin: Oh yes, I do fear them. I think, such tendencies could lead to a reduction in our nuclear capabilities in the theater of war, and in that sense, I am very worried. It is not clear to me how I should then have enough means for an effective and adequate defense. That is particularly important in view of deterrence, because my main mission is preventing, not waging, war. I believe that in this theater there can be no deterrence without nuclear weapons.

SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: According to NATO sources, the Alliance will modernize its nuclear artillery grenades, possibly this summer.

Galvin: Those grenades are already being modernized. That has been done since the 1983 Montebello decision. That should be continued. So, modernization of nuclear artillery has begun, but I would like to see more of that.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: Beside other countries, the Federal Republic also fails to meet the objective that NATO seeks to achieve—to increase defense budgets by 3 percent annually. Do you need more money, in particular from the Germans, to strengthen the conventional defense potential?

Galvin: I hope the Federal Republic will meet the objective of real growth of its defense budget by 3 percent this year. The budget is still being discussed, but I realize the 3-percent goal very likely will not be reached. Yet, I am still hoping it will. However, I do not want to point to the Federal Republic in particular. My objective is for all countries to meet the 3 percent growth. At present, some 5 countries do that.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: There has been a heated discussion in the Federal Republic on the so-called Ikke paper, the report on discriminate deterrence. In that document the authors request, among other things, that NATO create the capacity to launch major conventional counterattacks involving ground troops deep into an aggressor's rear country. Do you agree?

Galvin: I have read the report. The NATO strategy does not contemplate such a concept. We do not plan an attack against the Warsaw Pact. We intend to defend our own territory—each centimeter of it. That is our whole defense strategy. It does not include a major attack on a target in the Warsaw Pact. What is suggested in the report does not reflect the U.S. Administration's official position, nor does it have any influence on the NATO strategy.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: But does that report reflect the mainstream of U.S. security considerations?

Galvin: The report is a work that was submitted by a group of experts. They are specialists with a broad range of experiences. Whether the paper therefore represents the mainstream, is a different question. I cannot answer it like that. I prefer to believe that the mainstream of U.S. strategic thinking is already represented in the NATO Alliance.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: The FOFA (Follow-On Forces Attack) concept includes deep strikes with aircraft, missiles, and other systems. The Warsaw Pact considers that an offensive option. Do you see the danger of FOFA possibly complicating the new talks on conventional arms control in Europe?

Galvin: Our strategy says we will always have a defensive, never an offensive strategy. We plan to defend ourselves against the first wave of an attack. We also plan counterattacks against the second wave, to reduce the

impact of such an attack against us. Now, the Soviets say we also plan to launch counterattacks—that is an offensive strategy. I do not agree. An aggressor cannot expect to be protected in his attack.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: So you do not see the arms control conference in Europe in jeopardy?

Galvin: No.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: What results would the SACEUR like the conference to reach? You know that some people think short-range weapons should also be discussed in Vienna.

Galvin: We should not mix different negotiations. The negotiations as such are complicated enough, and it is not necessary to mix strategic and tactical or nuclear and conventional things.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: What priorities do you have for conventional disarmament?

Galvin: I think we should enter conventional negotiations as soon as possible. In the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact we have to achieve a sort of numerical equality or balance.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: There have been serious differences recently between Washington and other Alliance partners over participation by the Europeans in actions outside NATO, for instance, in the Gulf. Do you think such differences could weaken the U.S. commitment in Europe and its solidarity with Europe?

Galvin: I do not want to speculate on essentially political problems of the U.S. commitment in Europe. There are clear indications that beside the United States, other NATO members are ready to see their responsibility in areas outside the Alliance. They have demonstrated such responsibility by specific actions.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: So you believe the Europeans have demonstrated enough responsibility in areas outside the Alliance?

Galvin: Whether it is enough or not is not a problem for me. I am seeing solid indications of such responsibility in a number of NATO members.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: The United States has recently started building a bomb for chemical warfare. Does SACEUR need a special potential for chemical deterrence?

Galvin: I think NATO needs to have chemical deterrence until we have abolished chemical weapons worldwide and have verified that. I think the Alliance should also have the capacity of retaliation in that field, as well as the capacity to defend itself against chemical weapons. If we have a strong defense against chemical weapons,

the enemy will be prevented from considering using such weapons. I think history has shown that the retaliatory capacity of chemical weapons constitutes effective deterrence.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: An attack with chemical weapons would probably require a rapid response. Should the new chemical weapons be deployed in Europe?

Galvin: If I had to decide, I would like to see chemical weapons deployed in Europe. There are objections. If those objections by the NATO members cannot be overcome we will have to find an alternative. That means we would not deploy such weapons in Europe.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: That corresponds to the current political situation... **Galvin:** I advocate deployment in Europe because I believe this would strengthen deterrence. In that case we would have the chemical weapons where the troops are deployed. If we stored them in the United States, they would have to be transported. That would take longer.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: The credibility of deterrence is always a matter of psychology. There are prominent strategists in Bonn who say that as long as U.S. troops are deployed in the FRG we must have short-range nuclear weapons here. Otherwise the United States could be forced to use its strategic weapons too early to protect its troops.

Galvin: Deterrence is the reason we have short-range weapons in Europe. Everything else is of secondary importance, including the direct protection of U.S. forces. That is secondary to the prime reason which is to have short-range weapons that are not only used by the United States, but, in the case of the Lance missiles, by 6 other countries. Regarding aircraft that can be equipped with nuclear weapons and artillery, they can even be used by 8 countries. That means that if nuclear weapons had to be used, the United States would use such weapons for the defense of all the other NATO countries. Many NATO countries would also use them

for their own defense. That demonstrates larger credibility of the possible use of nuclear weapons in defense and at the same time constitutes intensified deterrence, in other words, a better opportunity to preserve peace.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Kohl To Stress Chemical Weapons Ban at Talks
17170948 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 17 Feb 88 p 4

[Horst Schreitter-Schwarzenfeld article: 'Kohl Wants To Pin Down Reagan on Chemical Weapons Ban']

[Text] Bonn, 16 Feb—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU), who will begin a 3-day visit to Washington this Wednesday, intends to emphasize to the Reagan administration that an agreement should be concluded this year in the Geneva negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. Circles close to Kohl stated this on Tuesday in Bonn. The discussion partners conceded, however, that Bonn's pressure is not necessarily synonymous with "success."

The chancellor wants to ensure that a 1986 German-U.S. agreement on the withdrawal of chemical weapons from the FRG will remain valid when Ronald Reagan's successor will have taken over. At the 1986 Tokyo economic summit meeting, Kohl and Reagan agreed that Bonn would agree within NATO to the building of new (so-called binary) chemical weapons, while Washington would commit itself not to deploy chemical warfare agents in the FRG, and to withdraw the already-deployed chemical weapons by 1992. It was said in Bonn that an exchange of letters on that agreement has taken place between Kohl and Reagan. U.S. General John Galvin, the NATO commander in chief, recently urged the deployment of new weapons in the FRG.

The Kohl delegation, made up of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), Bundestag deputies Volker Ruehe (CDU) and Uwe Ronneburger (FDP), as well as Professor Werner Weidenfeld, the coordinator of German-U.S. relations, is focusing its interest on the continuation of the disarmament process. Government circles said in this connection that Bonn is advocating the development of a general NATO concept.

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